It's Almost as Good at TV!

Here's some Frontinus for you all. Everyone needs a little Frontinus in his life. Book II 5.31:

When Sertorius was encamped next to Pompey near the town of Lauron in Spain, there were only two tracts from which forage could be gathered, one near by, the other farther off. Sertorius gave orders that the one near by should be continually raided by light-armed troops, but that remoter one should not be visited by any troops. Thus, he finally convinced his adversaries that the more distant tract was safer. When, on one occasion, Pompey's troops had gone to this region, Sertorius ordered Octavius Graecinus, with ten cohorts armed after the Roman fashion, and ten cohorts of light-armed Spaniards along with Tarquinius Priscus and two thousand cavalry, set forth to lay an ambush against the foragers. These men executed their instructions with energy; for after examining the ground, they hid the above-mentioned forces by night in a neighbouring wood, posting the light-armed Spaniards in front, as best suited to stealthy warfare, the shield-bearing soldiers a little further back, and the cavalry in the rear, in order that the plan might not be betrayed by the neighing of the horses. Then they ordered all to repose in silence till the third hour of the following day. When Pompey's men, entertaining no suspicion and loaded down with forage, thought of returning, and those who had been on guard, lured on by the situation, were slipping away to forage, suddenly the Spaniards, darting out with the swiftness characteristic of their race, poured forth upon the stragglers, inflicted many wounds upon them, and put them to rout, to their great amazement. Then, before resistance to this first assault could be organised, the shield-bearing troops, bursting forth from the forest, overthrew and routed the Romans who were returning to the ranks, while the cavalry, dispatched after those in flight, followed them all the way back to the camp, cutting them to pieces. Provision was also made that no one should escape. For two hundred and fifty reserve horsemen, sent ahead for the purpose, found it a simple matter to race forward by short cuts, and then to turn back and meet those who had first fled, before they reached Pompey's camp. On learning of this, Pompey sent out a legion under Decimus Laelius to reinforce his men, whereupon the cavalry of the enemy, withdrawing to the right flank, pretended to give way, and then, passing round the legion, assaulted it from the rear, while those who had followed up the foragers attacked it from the front also. Thus the legion with its commander was crushed between the two lines of the enemy. When Pompey led out his entire army to help the legion, Sertorius exhibited his forces drawn up on the hillside, and thus baulked Pompey's purpose. Thus, in addition to inflicting a twofold disaster, as a result of the same strategy, Sertorius forced Pompey to be the helpless witness of the destruction of his own troops. This was the first battle between Sertorius and Pompey. According to Livy, ten thousand men were lost in Pompey's army, along with the entire transport.

Some notes. The battle took place in 77 BC. The third watch is around 9:00 AM. A cohort was composed of 480 men, and legion was made of ten cohorts. The Romans, and their similarly armed and trained Spanish counterparts, would have had a chain-mail shirts, bronze helmets, long oval shields, a javelin, and a short stabbing sword. The light armed soldiers would have had a number of javelins, a small shield, and maybe the helmet. The cavalry had a few javelins, a longer sword, a helmet, and some kind of armor on their chest (metal or leather). Oh, and no pants. Except for maybe of the Spanish. But then they were barbarians.

So. Sertorius is brilliant, yes? It's not everyday that you get to cut down two Roman legions with hardly a casualty. Incredibly detailed and well thought out plan and some brilliant execution. But there's more than that. Luck was involved too. The ambush worked so well that no Roman, if any survived uncaptured, was able to get back to warn Pompey or Laelius of the size of the ambush. Pompey must have been expecting the kinds of ambushes he put up with over the nearer foraging ground. Bad assumption. Laelius, then, was meant command a relief force and not a force capable of independent action. The Romans had an inherent to dislike of skirmishers and cavalry and consequently had very few in their armies. Pompey would have sent a sizable contingent of cavalry and skirmishers with foragers to, you know, ward off an ambush. Since these were already dead, not that he knew that, and since he would have kept the majority of those kinds of troops with him in case Sertorius offered battle, it's most likely that Laelius marched out without any supporting force at all. Remember he was supposed to be leading reinforcements. That Priscus' cavalry could flank him so easily is pretty good evidence that I'm right. The result, then, was pretty much set in stone.

That being said. Here's the image that's staying with me. Sertorius must have been watching the initial force of foragers in case it was bigger than usual and he had to call off the ambush. Seeing as it was the normal contingent, he would have signaled the go-ahead. Since the first battle took place under the trees, he wouldn't have been able to see anything, though he would have been confident of success. I can't imagine the feeling he had when he saw Laelius' men march out of Pompey's camp. Seeing them without enough numbers and without sufficient cavalry and skirmishers, he would have known that the first engagement was an unqualified success and that is was highly probable that every single one of them was going to die. Then, after the inevitable result, he got to watch Pompey make preparations to march out, knowing that he would be able to counter that too and that all Pompey could do was sit back and take it.

Dark stuff. But fascinating.